Abstract
In our tradition, Socrates, as he figures in the work of Plato, stands for rationality. In one way, of course, the tendency to treat him as rationality incarnate is not too far of the mark; for Socrates does indeed introduce into our thought and discussions a demand for argument, for stringency and consistency. However, the manner in which Socrates carries out his historically influential elenctic activity belies the shortcomings of this oft-quoted and inspirational picture. It is these irrational features of the figure of Socrates in Plato's early dialogues that shall concern us in this article. Although we shall see that a certain sort of interlocutor is required for Socratic questioning to get off the ground, heavily irrational features are brought to the activity from Socrates himself. Furthermore, Socrates’ irrationality is no extraneous matter in relation to the very notion of dialectic rationality, but results from certain features of rationality itself understood in the mode of critical dialogue.1