The Growing Block’s past problems

Philosophical Studies 173 (3):699-709 (2016)
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The Growing-Block view of time has some problems with the past. It is committed to the existence of the past, but needs to say something about the difference between the past and present. I argue that we should resist Correia and Rosenkranz’ response to Braddon-Mitchell’s argument that the Growing-Block leads to scepticism about whether we are present. I consider an approach, similar to Peter Forrest, and show it is not so counter-intuitive as Braddon-Mitchell suggests and further show that it requires no ‘semantic and metaphysical gymnastics’, as Chris Heathwood has suggested. In doing these things I make the problem of the past on the Growing-Block view a problem in its history, not its present



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Graeme A. Forbes
University of Kent

References found in this work

Time, Tense, and Causation.Michael Tooley - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.
A future for presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Future for Presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.

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