On the very idea of denying the existence of radically different conceptual schemes

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):133 – 185 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has become very popular among philosophers to attempt to discredit, or at least set severe limits to, the thesis that there exist conceptual schemes radically different from ours. This fashion is misconceived. Philosophers have attempted to justify it in two main ways: by means of arguments which are a priorist relative to the relevant linguistic and textual evidence (and either independent of or based upon positive theories of meaning, understanding, and interpretation); and by means of arguments which are a posteriorist relative to that evidence. The former approach is misconceived, not only in that its particular arguments fail, but also in principle. The latter approach, while in general the right sort of approach to adopt to the question, arrives at its conclusion only through faulty execution, through misinterpretation of the evidence. Though quite unjustified, philosophers' hostility to the thesis of radically different conceptual schemes is easily explained, namely, in terms of a number of psychologically powerful motives which it subserves. These motives cannot step in to provide the missing justification, however. Instead, they reveal such hostility in an even shadier light.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Relativist Challenge to Comparative Philosophy.Ewing Chinn - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):451-466.
Incommensurability in cognitive guise.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):29 – 43.
Consciousness and Conceptual Schema.Daniel D. Hutto - 2001 - In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 15-43.
Three models of conceptual schemes.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):407 – 426.
Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages.Xinli Wang - 2007 reprint - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:119-124.
Conceptual relativism.Anthony Brueckner - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):295–301.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
129 (#131,046)

6 months
4 (#319,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Förster
Universität Bonn

Citations of this work

On Davidson's refutation of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism.Xinli Wang - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.
Relativism and Alethic Functionalism.Dan Zeman - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1):53-71.
What Can You Say, Words It Is, Nothing Else Going.Pierre Legrand - 2013 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 26 (4):805-832.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
Charity, interpretation, and belief.Colin McGinn - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (9):521-535.

Add more references