David Forman
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
For Kant, any authentic moral demands are wholly distinct from the demands of prudence. This has led critics to complain that Kantian moral demands are incompatible with our human nature as happiness-seekers. Kant’s defenders have pointed out, correctly, that Kant can and does assert that it is permissible, at least in principle, to pursue our own happiness. But this response does not eliminate the worry that a life organized around the pursuit of virtue might turn out to be one from which we cannot expect any of this (permissible) happiness. To address this worry, Kant would need to establish that there is a kind of harmony between virtue and our own happiness that can give us confidence that aiming at morality does not require us to abandon our hope for happiness in this life. This paper aims to show that Kant—building on insights from Rousseau that Kant identifies with Cynicism—does offer an account of such a harmony between virtue and worldly happiness.
Keywords Kant  Happiness  Cynic  Ethics  Garve  Eudaimonism  sustine et abstine
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2016.0000
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References found in this work BETA

Principled and Unprincipled Maxims.David Forman - 2012 - Kant-Studien 103 (3):318-336.
Kant on Happiness in the Moral Life.Gary Watson - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:79-108.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kant on Moral Satisfaction.Michael Walschots - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (2):281-303.
Kant’s Quasi‐Eudaimonism.Erica A. Holberg - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):317-341.
Deontological Eudaemonism.Jeanine M. Grenberg - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 1431-1438.

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