Abstract

A number of authors in recent liberal political theory have advanced an ‘argument from integrity’ in favour of legal accommodations. This holds that people are entitled to forms of legal accommodations every time they can plausibly claim that complying with a certain norm compromises their ability to act in accordance with some fundamental personal values. I advance two points against this argument. Valuing integrity unconditionally is implausible because a life devoid of integrity is one that does not prevent anyone from developing crucial liberal virtues. If integrity is valued conditionally, on the other hand, its normative role becomes redundant. In fact, I argue, the key liberal values of fairness and toleration can give a more plausible guidance with regard to the problem of how to treat (and sometimes accommodate) moral commitments that are incompatible with public norms. I conclude that the notion of personal integrity is, by itself, unnecessary and possibly detrimental in a theory of justice.