Counterfactual reasoning in the bell-epr paradox

Philosophy of Science 53 (1):133-144 (1986)
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Abstract

Skyrms's formulation of the argument against stochastic hidden variables in quantum mechanics using conditionals with chance consequences suffers from an ambiguity in its "conservation" assumption. The strong version, which Skyrms needs, packs in a "no-rapport" assumption in addition to the weaker statement of the "experimental facts." On the positive side, I argue that Skyrms's proof has two unnoted virtues (not shared by previous proofs): (1) it shows that certain difficulties that arise for deterministic hidden variable theories that exploit a nonclassical probability theory extend to the stochastic case; (2) the use of counterfactual conditionals relates the Bell puzzle to Dummett's (1976) discussion of realism in quantum mechanics

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Malcolm Forster
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Conditional Excluded Middle without the Limit Assumption.Eric Swanson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):301-321.
Explanation, subjunctives and statistical theories.Del Ratzsch - 1988 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):80-96.

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References found in this work

Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):419-425.
Quantum mysteries for anyone.N. David Mermin - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (7):397-408.

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