Chapter 6. Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs

In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 32-40 (2012)
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Richard Foley
New York University

Citations of this work

Luck and Reasons.Spencer Paulson - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.
Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.
Knowledge requires belief – and it doesn’t? On belief as such and belief necessary for knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):151-167.

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