Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal

New York, US: Oxford University Press USA (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Human beings are both supremely rational and deeply superstitious, capable of believing just about anything and of questioning just about everything. Indeed, just as our reason demands that we know the truth, our skepticism leads to doubts we can ever really do so. In Walking the Tightrope of Reason, Robert J. Fogelin guides readers through a contradiction that lies at the very heart of philosophical inquiry. Fogelin argues that our rational faculties insist on a purely rational account of the universe, yet at the same time, the inherent limitations of these faculties ensure that we will never fully satisfy that demand. As a result of being driven to this point of paradox, we either comfort ourselves with what Kant called "metaphysical illusions" or adopt a stance of radical skepticism. No middle ground seems possible and, as Fogelin shows, skepticism, even though a healthy dose of it is essential for living a rational life, "has an inherent tendency to become unlimited in its scope, with the result that the edifice of rationality is destroyed." In much Postmodernist thought, for example, skepticism takes the extreme form of absolute relativism, denying the basis for any value distinctions and treating all truth-claims as equally groundless. How reason avoids disgracing itself, walking a fine line between dogmatic belief and self-defeating doubt, is the question Fogelin seeks to answer. Reflecting upon the ancient Greek skeptics as well as such thinkers as Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, and Whitman, this book takes readers into--and through--some of philosophy's most troubling paradoxes.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Hume’s Skeptical Crisis: A Textual Study. [REVIEW]Benjamin Hill - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):530-531.
Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement.David Godden & William H. Brenner - 2010 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.
Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Pyrrhonian skepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Hume's skeptical crisis: a textual study.Robert J. Fogelin - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowing when disagreements are deep.David M. Adams - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):65-77.
Philosophical interpretations.Robert J. Fogelin - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-14

Downloads
3 (#1,644,941)

6 months
3 (#880,460)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

A Swan, and Pike, and a crawfish walk into a bar.Shimon Edelman - 2008 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Ai 20:261-268.
Critical Normativity.Joseph William Singer - 2009 - Law and Critique 20 (1):27-42.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references