Formation of false memories as a memory strategy

Докса 2 (2017)
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Abstract

Authours of this article consider the creation of false memories as a memory strategy. They define the cause, mechanism and important factors, which influence their creation. In the introductory part, a common view on memory is put under doubt for its static conception of memory. As memory appears to be dynamic rather than static, different processes can occur and memories can be changed. That is why authors define the goal in the introduction as follows: to define the causes and mechanisms of false memory creation. The first two chapters describe memory from the inside. In the first chapter authors appeal to analytic philosophers D. Chalmers and N. Goodman in order to inspect memory as not only a physical, but also a mental phenomenon that can construct memories. There we define the possible causes of such construction. The second chapter goes deeper into the problem and tells us about false memories from the point of view of the philosopher of mind D. Dennett and cognitive psychologist E. Loftus, whereas the third chapter describes the look on memory from the outside, from perspective of neuroscientists A. Koob and S. J. Sara. In the conclusion, we sum up the results and offer perspectives of further research on false memories phenomenon.

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