Social Choice and Welfare 35 (1):65-79 (2010)

Authors
Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Abstract
This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.
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References found in this work BETA

A Measure of Freedom.Ian Carter (ed.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press UK.
A Measure of Freedom.Ian Carter - 2001 - Law and Philosophy 20 (5):531-540.
On the Analysis of Negative Freedom.Martin van Hees - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (2):175-197.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents?Martin Peterson - 2011 - Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (3):411-424.
Preference and Choice.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Dissertation, Royal Institute of Technology

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