The logic of being informed

Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):433-460 (2006)


One of the open problems in the philosophy of information is whether there is an information logic (IL), different from epistemic (EL) and doxastic logic (DL), which formalises the relation “a is informed that p” (Iap) satisfactorily. In this paper, the problem is solved by arguing that the axiom schemata of the normal modal logic (NML) KTB (also known as B or Br or Brouwer’s system) are well suited to formalise the relation of “being informed”. After having shown that IL can be constructed as an informational reading of KTB, four consequences of a KTB-based IL are explored: information overload; the veridicality thesis (Iap → p); the relation between IL and EL; and the Kp → Bp principle or entailment property, according to which knowledge implies belief. Although these issues are discussed later in the article, they are the motivations behind the development of IL.

Download options


External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

110 (#109,439)

6 months
8 (#90,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luciano Floridi
Oxford University