Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):417-442 (2008)
AbstractMany social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed to involve the application of second-order ToM is the comprehension of sentences that the hearer can only understand by considering the speaker’s alternatives. In this study we tested 40 children between 8 and 10 years old and 27 adult controls on (adaptations of) the three tasks mentioned above: the false belief task, a strategic game, and a sentence comprehension task. The results show interesting differences between adults and children, between the three tasks, and between this study and previous research.
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Strategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models From Logical Formulas.Sujata Ghosh, Ben Meijering & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (1):1-29.
Children’s First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task.Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout & Petra Hendriks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
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