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Brain processes and phenomenal consciousness: A new and specific hypothesis
Theory and Psychology 1:245-62 (1990)
Abstract
A hypothesis on the physiological conditions for the occurrence of phenomenal states is presented. It is suggested that the presence of phenomenal states depends on the rate at which neural assemblies are formed. Unconsciousness and various disturbances of phenomenal consciousness occur if the assembly formation rate is below a certain threshold level; if this level is surpassed, phenomenal states necessarily result. A critical production rate of neural assemblies is the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of phenomenal states.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
EEG oscillatory states as neuro-phenomenology of consciousness as revealed from patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states.Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
A possible role for cholinergic neurons of the basal forebrain and pontomesencephalon in consciousness.Nancy J. Woolf - 1997 - Consciousness and Cognition 6 (4):574-596.
Do we need a theory-based assessment of consciousness in the field of disorders of consciousness?Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:402.
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