On Street Harassment

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2):231-241 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues that it can be morally wrong to be friendly to strangers. More specifically, the paper argues there is a salient pro tanto moral reason against being friendly to strangers in virtue of the structure of interaction. By ‘a salient pro tanto reason’ I mean a reason that is not always decisive, but it is often significant enough that it ought to factor in moral deliberation. My argument is perfectly general, but it is presented to shed light on one specific practical problem. By considering this issue I think we will be able to see what is distinctly wrong with street harassment. I hope to explain why this sort of behavior is morally problematic. Basically, even in its most benign cases, street harassment attempts to place a moral burden on a stranger to respond in kind. The stranger may not wish to bear this burden and that is why there are reasons against creating this burden. It is wrong because it involves treating others as if they owe you attention and acknowledgment, which is to treat strangers as friends.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sexual Harassment in Public Places.Margaret Crouch - 2009 - Social Philosophy Today 25:137-148.
Sexual Harassment in Public Places.Margaret Crouch - 2009 - Social Philosophy Today 25:137-148.
Can sexual harassment be salvaged?M. J. Booker - 1998 - Journal of Business Ethics 17 (11):1171-1177.
On the persistence of sexual harassment in the workplace.S. Gayle Baugh - 1997 - Journal of Business Ethics 16 (9):899-908.
Sexual Harassment: A Debate.Linda LeMoncheck & Mane Hajdin - 1997 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Stop Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’.Jennifer Saul - 2014 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (3):307-321.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-19

Downloads
38 (#395,329)

6 months
9 (#235,983)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrick Fleming
James Madison University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references