Abstract

This dissertation aims to explain and to assess critically the concept of supererogation that is currently in dominant use in contemporary normative ethics, to introduce and subsequently to argue for a revised understanding of the concept, and finally to re-examine the nature of heroes and saints, persons traditionally thought to epitomize the supererogatory agent. According to dominant contemporary understandings of supererogation, one who exceeds one's moral duty does so optionally, is deserving of moral praise, and would not be deserving of moral censure for declining to so act. While recognizing the importance of the distinction between duty and supererogation, this dissertation seeks to modify the dominant view by arguing that to fail repeatedly in one's life to go beyond the call of duty is to betray certain shortcomings of character for which one can be morally blamed. It argues that the maxim to go beyond the call of duty is, in effect, a virtue-based imperative, suggested by various moral and religious traditions, which bids one to improve one's character over time and thereby to re-establish the nature and scope of one's moral obligations. Finally, it aims to show that this maxim of character improvement can be shown to be present in some strands of contemporary Jewish and Christian thought. ;Throughout the argument the testimony of heroes and saints is held under close scrutiny. Since heroes and saints perform actions that range from especially costly to maximally demanding, they are traditionally understood to go above and beyond the call of duty every time they perform their heroic and saintly acts, in spite of how they themselves interpret their conduct. Against the dominant view, this dissertation argues that heroes and saints have the ability to discern correctly what is morally required of them. They are not just persons with an unusually high degree of moral fortitude, as defenders of the dominant view grant. They are also credible moral authorities, who, precisely because they are more virtuous than us, can be trusted not to mischaracterize the moral status of their own actions