Abstract

The task of this chapter is to explore why the experience of value, especially the value of other persons, is primary in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It will achieve this by developing an understanding of Levinas's oft-quoted, but widely misunderstood, idea that ethics is first philosophy and by showing how this is best grasped when the Levinasian approach to ethics is understood as optics - a way of seeing things - rather than as a systematic ethical theory or moral philosophy. The chapter will begin by situating Levinas in his historical and philosophical context and then explaining some of the fundamental tenets of his approach, such as are necessary for understanding his philosophy. The chapter will then explore why Levinas understood ethics as 'first philosophy', aligning this with his comment that ethics is an optics, and then proceed to show how his insights - if they are in any way accurate - reveal that the experience of value is fundamental to any human activity. It then concludes by looking towards some of the implications of the philosophy of Levinas and uses the case study of education to do so