Acta Analytica 28 (3):345-352 (2013)

Brian Flanagan
Maynooth University
One way to discredit the suggestion that a statement is true just in virtue of its meaning is to observe that its truth is the subject of genuine disagreement. By appealing to the case of the unorthodox philosopher, Timothy Williamson has recast this response as an argument foreclosing any appeal to analyticity. Reconciling Quine’s epistemological holism with his treatment of the ‘deviant logician’, I show that we may discharge the demands of charitable interpretation even while attributing trivial semantic error to Williamson’s philosophers. Williamson’s effort to generalize the argument from disagreement therefore fails
Keywords Analyticity  Disagreement  Epistemological holism  Williamson, Timothy  Quine, Willard Van Orman
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0172-2
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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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