Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

Abstract

The Naive View (TNV) of Inferential Knowledge (slogan): (TNV) Inferential knowledge requires known relevant premises. One key aspect of (TNV) is “counter-closure” [9, 10].

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

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