Earman on old evidence and measures of confirmation

Abstract

In Bayes or Bust? John Earman quickly dismisses a possible resolution (or avoidance) of the problem of old evidence. In this note, I argue that his dismissal is premature, and that the proposed resolution (when charitably reconstructed) is reasonable.

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

Citations of this work

A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.Jan Sprenger - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):383-401.
A New Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.Stephan Hartmann - 2014 - In Conference PSA 2014. Chicago, USA:
Defining Background Information: A Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.Philose Koshy - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (2):297-304.

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References found in this work

Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon & Anne Fagot-Largeault - 1989 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):355.
Bayesianism With A Human Face.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1983 - In John Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 133--156.
Higher order degrees of belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.
A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.Jan Sprenger - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):383-401.

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