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A Rejoinder to Strevens
Abstract
By and large, we think Strevens’s [6] is a useful reply to our original critique [2] of his paper on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem [5]. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original paper). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens’s approach to QD.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
The bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses.Michael Strevens - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
Degree of confirmation.Karl R. Popper - 1954 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 5 (18):143-149.
The bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman.Michael Strevens - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):913-918.
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