Actuality, Possibility, and Being

Review of Metaphysics 3 (3):367 - 384 (1950)
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Abstract

Metaphysics is self-critical in a way and to an extent not to be found in any other field of study. This is an outcome of its extreme generality. Its subject-matter includes all subject-matters and hence all methodologies. Therefore metaphysics is also concerned with its own methodology. There is no more inclusive or more general study of methodology which might take upon itself the authority to criticize the methodology of metaphysics. Any such study would have to concern itself with all concepts and subject-matters, and so would itself be simply metaphysics. Any general denial of metaphysics is itself a metaphysical theory, and therefore self-contradictory.

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