The evil of death and the Lucretian symmetry: a reply to Feldman

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):783-789 (2013)
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Abstract

In previous work we have defended the deprivation account of death’s badness against worries stemming from the Lucretian point that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are deprivations of the same sort. In a recent article in this journal, Fred Feldman has offered an insightful critique of our Parfitian strategy for defending the deprivation account of death’s badness. Here we adjust, clarify, and defend our strategy for reply to Lucretian worries on behalf of the deprivation account

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2012-01-25

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John Fischer
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Past and Future Non-Existence.Jens Johansson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):51-64.

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References found in this work

Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
Why is death bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
Brueckner and Fischer on the evil of death.Fred Feldman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):309-317.
Death.John Martin Fischer - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.
Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.

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