Representational Content and the Keys to Success

Abstract

I consider the question of whether success-linked theories of content – theories like those of Ramsey (1927), Millikan (1984) and Blackburn (2005) which take there to be a definitional link between representational content and behavioral success – are consistent with the plausible claim that we can use content-attributions to explain behavioral success. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) argues that success-linked theories of content are too closely linked to success to be able to explain it. Against this, I present a plausible account of how content-attributions make available good explanations of behavioral success, and argue that if we want our content-attributions to be able to do this explanatory work, then we actually need to embrace a success-linked theory of content

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Justin Fisher
Southern Methodist University

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