Moral Opposites - An examination of intuitions concerning the amoralist and the moral saint


Authors
Jessica Fischer
University College London
Abstract
In this thesis I want to take a look at the extreme ends of the moral spectrum. Specifically, I am going to examine the very extremes of the moral spectrum, namely the amoralist and the moral saint. I want to take a look at the justifications we have for the intuitions people commonly hold about these two opposites; the intuition being that both an amoralist and a moral saint are undesirable ideals. In examining both cases, I aim to answer the central question of my thesis: can the commonly held intuitions about both the amoralist and the moral saint be justified?
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