Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595 (2013)

Authors
Garrett Pendergraft
Pepperdine University
John Fischer
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature of begging the question. Although the charge of begging the question is frequently made in philosophy, it is surprisingly difficult to pin down the precise nature of this dialectical infelicity (or family of such infelicities). Thus we offer some new proposals about the nature of begging the question with an eye to understanding what is going on in central cases in which the charge is legitimately made. We then defend the Consequence Argument against the charge that it begs the question, so construed. We contend that, whatever the other liabilities of the argument may be, it does not beg the question against the compatibilist
Keywords Consequence argument  Begging the question  Free will  Incompatibilism  Compatibilism  Practical reasoning
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0053-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - London, England: Vale Press.

View all 77 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
Freedom and the Open Future.Yishai Cohen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Begging the Question.David H. Sanford - 1972 - Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
Petitio Principii: What's Wrong?Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
So-Far Incompatibilism and the so-Far Consequence Argument.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
The Consequence Argument.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.
On Begging the Systematicity Question.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-11-30

Total views
583 ( #14,059 of 2,499,776 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
60 ( #13,430 of 2,499,776 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes