Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination

In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 144--167 (2008)

Abstract

In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is a plausible explanation of just how two mental states which have no common component might be indistinguishable for their subject and this in turn will require the telling of a positive story about hallucination. This is the goal of the present essay

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Bill Fish
Massey University

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Citations of this work

A Sense of Reality.Katalin Farkas - 2014 - In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucinations. MIT Press. pp. 399-417.
The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.Susanna Siegel - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224.
Good News for the Disjunctivist About (One of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
Two Conceptions of Phenomenology.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-17.

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