Abstract

Recently, there have been a number of government proposals and reforms seeking to ensure that standard setting in risk regulation is carried out in a more accountable and transparent manner. These proposals were a direct and indirect response to distrust in government both in relation to risk regulation and across government more widely. The problem, however, is that few of these proposals and reforms have been grounded in an understanding of the nature of standard setting in risk regulation. Such standard setting has three significant features. It is directly concerned with normative issues about risk acceptability, is carried out in circumstances of scientific uncertainty, and requires some form of expert judgment. Rather, these proposals were based on a presumption that standard setting is primarily an analytical process which is verifiable and objective. There are a number of likely consequences of the disjunction between the nature of standard setting and these developments which include problems of ossification, the submersion of normative debate, and a fundamental shift in the nature of public administration. These problems provide an excellent example of the dangers of implementing accountability mechanisms without regard to the complexities of the decision-making context