Abortion, autonomy, and control over one's body

Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):286-306 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is often thought that if a developing human being is considered a “person” from the beginning, then it would follow that abortion would be impermissible. For, after all, a person has a stringent right to life, and because life is a prerequisite for enjoying any other goods, it is plausible that the right to life is a “basic” or “fundamental” one, not easily overridden by other considerations. The right to life, it would seem, could not be outweighed by another individual's preferences, even preferences about what should happen in or to her body

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
173 (#107,295)

6 months
5 (#441,012)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Fischer
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Abortion and Ownership.John Martin Fischer - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (4):275-304.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references