Too Much Morality

In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press (2008)
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Abstract

This paper addresses the nature and relationship of morality and self-interest, arguing that what we morally ought to do almost always conflicts with what we self-interestedly ought to do. The concept of morality is analyzed as being essentially and radically other-regarding, and the category of the supererogatory is explained as consisting in what we morally ought to do but are not socially expected to do. I express skepticism about whether there is a coherent question, ‘Which ought I all things considered to obey?’ and suggest that the best substitute is a question about which is more important for me. Importance for a person, in turn, is explained as dependent upon what a person is disposed to care about. I suggest that morality and self-interest are both relatively unimportant for us when compared with our other ends

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Stephen Finlay
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Wronging Oneself.Daniel Muñoz & Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Oughts and ends.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.
Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The limits of morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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