Space-time counterfactuals

Synthese 119 (3):287-298 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A definition is proposed to give precise meaning to the counterfactual statements that often appear in discussions of the implications of quantum mechanics. Of particular interest are counterfactual statements which involve events occurring at space-like separated points, which do not have an absolute time ordering. Some consequences of this definition are discussed.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1023/a:1005286229775

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Time-symmetrised quantum theory, counterfactuals and 'advanced action'.E. R. - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 30 (2):237-259.
Is quantum mechanics pointless?Frank Arntzenius - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1447-1457.
Newton's views on space, time, and motion.Robert Rynasiewicz - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Identity, space-time, and cosmology.Jan Faye - 2008 - In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Space-Time II. Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 39-57.
Space and time.Richard Swinburne - 1968 - New York,: St. Martin's Press.
Discussion: Time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals.Lev Vaidman - manuscript

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
92 (#182,422)

6 months
4 (#790,687)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Relativity, Quantum Entanglement, Counterfactuals, and Causation.Luke Fenton-Glynn & Thomas Kroedel - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):45-67.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Outcome predictions and property attribution: the EPR argument reconsidered.GianCarlo Ghirardi & Renata Grassi - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):397-423.

View all 16 references / Add more references