Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2005)

Kit Fine
New York University
This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to any form of metaphysical necessity; the need to make a distinction between the worldly and unworldly, analogous to the distinction between the tensed and the tenseless; and the viability of a nonstandard form of realism about tense, which recognizes the tensed character of reality without conceding there is any privileged standpoint from which it is to be viewed.
Keywords modality  tense  ontology  time  identity  realism
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Reprint years 2006
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Call number BC199.M6.F56 2005
ISBN(s) 0199278717   9780199278701   0199278709   9780199278718
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Grounding and Necessity.Stephan Leuenberger - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):151-174.
Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
What is Presentism?Daniel Deasy - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):378-397.
Truth-Maker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic.Kit Fine - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):549-577.

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