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Damned if you do; damned if you don’t: The impasse in cognitive accounts of the Capgras Delusion
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):143-151 (2005)
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Citations of this work
Delusional Predictions and Explanations.Matthew Parrott - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):325-353.
Is the Capgras delusion an endorsement of experience?Federico Bongiorno - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (3):293-312.
Capgras delusion: An interactionist model.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.
Is the impostor hypothesis really so preposterous? Understanding the capgras experience.Marga Reimer - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):669 – 686.
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