Consciousness as Presence: An Exploration of the Illusion of Self

Buddhist Studies Review 30 (1):113-128 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Buddhism teaches that ‘self’ as a substantial, enduring entity is an illusion. But for self to be an illusion there must be something in our experience that is misinterpreted as self. What is this? The notion of an experiential self plays an important role in phenomenological investigations of conscious experience. Does the illusion of self consist in mistaking a purely experiential self for a substantial self? I argue against this and locate the source of the illusion in time-consciousness. It is the essence of consciousness to flow, but the flow of consciousness presupposes an experiential present. The experiential present — an abiding sense of ‘now’ — is the dimension through which experiences are experienced as streaming. It is this, I argue, that is misinterpreted as an enduring self. I support my account by arguing that the synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness can be accounted for in terms of impersonal, temporal experience, and that conceiving of consciousness as the presence-dimension rather than as the I-dimension affords a solution to the brain-bisection puzzle.

Similar books and articles

There is no stream of consciousness.Susan J. Blackmore - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):17-28.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Consciousness in meme machines.Susan J. Blackmore - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):19-30.
The hardest aspect of the illusion problem - and how to solve it.François Kammerer - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):124-139.
The contents of phenomenal consciousness: One relation to rule them all and in the unity bind them.Antti Revonsuo - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
Phenomenological approaches to consciousness.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 686--696.
The mineness of experience.Wolfgang Fasching - 2009 - Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.
Mineness without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-13

Downloads
1,454 (#7,118)

6 months
468 (#3,242)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Charles K. Fink
Miami Dade College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Phenomenological Mind.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - New York, NY: Routledge. Edited by Dan Zahavi.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

View all 18 references / Add more references