Envy's Non-Innocent Victims

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):1-22 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Envy has often been seen as a vice and the envied as its victims. I suggest that this plausible view has an important limitation: the envied sometimes actively try to provoke envy. They may, thus, be non-innocent victims. Having argued for this thesis, I draw some practical implications.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Envy and Its Discontents.Timothy Perrine & Kevin Timpe - 2014 - In Kevin Timpe & Craig Boyd (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-244.
The Moral Value of Envy.Krista K. Thomason - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.
Invideo et Amo: on Envying the Beloved.Sara Protasi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1765-1784.
Envy and Self-worth.Timothy Perrine - 2011 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):433-446.
Moral vice, cognitive virtue.Thomas Williams - 2003 - Philosophy and Literature 27 (1):223-230.
La caze on envy and resentment.Stan Van Hooft - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):141 – 147.
Excusing Economic Envy: On Injustice and Impotence.Miriam Bankovsky - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (2):257-279.
The Relation of Envy to Distributive Justice.Harrison P. Frye - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (3):501-524.
Varieties of Envy.Sara Protasi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):535-549.
Envy and its objects.Alessandra Fussi - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35).
Revaluing envy and resentment.Marguerite La Caze - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):155 – 158.
Education and the Politics of Envy.John Ahier & John Beck - 2003 - British Journal of Educational Studies 51 (4):320 - 343.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-03-05

Downloads
305 (#63,839)

6 months
112 (#33,065)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Iskra Fileva
University of Colorado, Boulder

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

The metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.
The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.

View all 28 references / Add more references