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Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori
Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-9 (2024)
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Publisher Correction: Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-1.
References found in this work
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
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