Phronesis 63 (3):229-256 (2018)

Authors
Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi
University College London
Abstract
_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 229 - 256 I argue that, for Aristotle, akratic actions are against one’s general commitment to act in accordance with one’s correct conception of one’s ends overall. Only some akratic actions are also against one’s correct decision to perform a particular action. This thesis explains Aristotle’s views on impetuous _akrasia_, weak _akrasia_, stubborn opinionated action and inverse _akrasia_. In addition, it sheds light on Aristotle’s account of practical rationality. Rational actions are coherent primarily with one’s commitments to one’s conception of the good and only secondarily with one’s decisions to perform a particular action.
Keywords Aristotle   akrasia   ends   practical rationality  prohairesis
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DOI 10.1163/15685284-12341350
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References found in this work BETA

Aristotle's First Principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics with Aristotle.Sarah Broadie - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.John M. Cooper - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be.Jozef Müller - 2016 - Ancient Philosophy 36 (1):173-195.

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