Philosophy of Science 45 (3):361-367 (1978)

Hartry Field
New York University
Bayesian decision theory can be viewed as the core of psychological theory for idealized agents. To get a complete psychological theory for such agents, you have to supplement it with input and output laws. On a Bayesian theory that employs strict conditionalization, the input laws are easy to give. On a Bayesian theory that employs Jeffrey conditionalization, there appears to be a considerable problem with giving the input laws. However, Jeffrey conditionalization can be reformulated so that the problem disappears, and in fact the reformulated version is more natural and easier to work with on independent grounds
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DOI 10.1086/288812
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Carnap's Empiricism.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6.

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