Abstract

This article explores the diverse meanings of evil in Ricœur’s philosophy by emphasizing Kant's influence and explaining why Ricœur renounces the question of the origins of evil. The central argument is based on a definition of evil in terms of what-ought-not-to-be so of what must be fought against through action. It underlines the risks of transforming this imperative into a moral and political utopia and takes note of evil in political sphere and violence. Different aspects of evil, such as terrorism, torture, and the death penalty, are discussed by looking at how Ricœur uses his ethics and his hermeneutics of the self in order to confront them, in particular, by stressing how different capacities are affected by suffering. Ultimately, when evil is conceived of as what ought-not-to-be, it is crucial to recognize the losses and the necessity of undergoing a work of mourning, as well as to take into consideration the plurality of evils.