What it takes to be a social agent?

In Marco Nørskov, Johanna Seibt & Oliver Quick (eds.), Culturally Sustainable Social Robotics. IOS Press. pp. 540-549 (2020)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present a philosophically inspired list of minimal requirements for social agency that may serve as a guideline for social robotics. Such a list does not aim at detailing the cognitive processes behind sociality but at providing an implementation-free characterization of the capacities and skills associated with sociality. We employ the notion of intentional stance as a methodological ground to study intentional agency and extend it into a social stance that takes into account social features of behavior. We discuss the basic requirements of sociality and different ways to understand them, and suggest some potential benefits of understanding them in an instrumentalist way in the context of social robotics.

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Author Profiles

Víctor Fernandez Castro
University of Granada
Raul Hakli
University of Helsinki

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References found in this work

Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition.Kristin Andrews - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):36-56.
A Framework for the Psychology of Norms.Chandra Sripada & Stephen Stich - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Volume 2: Culture and Cognition. , US: Oxford University Press.

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