Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare

Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):124-151 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based oncontext-independent choicesand the other based onreason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy evaluation (confirmed choices). I articulate three complementary arguments that, I claim, support confirmed choices as a more reliable proxy of welfare than context-independent and reason-based choices. Finally, I discuss the implications of these arguments fornudgesandboosts.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Welfare, Autonomy, and the Autonomy Fallacy.Dale Dorsey - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):141-164.
On the possibility of an anti-paternalist behavioural welfare economics.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (4):350-363.
Substantively Constrained Choice and Deference.Jules Holroyd - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):180-199.
The natural behavior debate: Two conceptions of animal welfare.Heather Browning - 2020 - Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science 23 (3):325-337.
The subjective intuition.Jennifer S. Hawkins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):61 - 68.
A proxy culture.Luciano Floridi - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):487–490.
A defense of the very idea of moral deference pessimism.Max Lewis - 2020 - Philosophical Studies (8):2323-2340.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-12

Downloads
10 (#1,123,760)

6 months
7 (#339,156)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1907 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 30 (4):401-401.

View all 26 references / Add more references