Synthese 126 (1-2):123-147 (2001)
Abstract |
Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is, in fact, a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this end both Tarski's definition of truth in terms of satisfaction and the T-sentences are taken into account
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Tarski's Definition and Truth-Makers.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
Similar books and articles
Analytics
Added to PP index
2013-11-03
Total views
32 ( #354,531 of 2,499,776 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,066 of 2,499,776 )
2013-11-03
Total views
32 ( #354,531 of 2,499,776 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,066 of 2,499,776 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads