In Lorenzo Magnani & Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Springer Verlag (2006)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Philosophers and neuroscientists often suggest that we perceptually represent objects and their properties. However, they start from very different background assumptions when they use the term “perceptual representation”. On the one hand, sometimes philosophers do not need to properly take into consideration the empirical evidence concerning the neural states subserving the representational perceptual processes they are talking about. On the other hand, neuroscientists do not rely on a meticulous definition of “perceptual representation” when they talk about this empirical evidence that is supposed to show that we perceptually represent such and such properties. It seems that, on both sides, something is missed. My aim is to show that, in the light of empirical evidence from neuroscience, the case of action properties is a good candidate in order to properly talk of perceptually represented properties. My claim is that the neurophysiological states encoding action properties are perceptual processes and that these perceptual processes are representational processes. That is, in the case of those neurophysiological states involved in the detection of action properties, it is correct to speak of perceptual representational states, and hence, ipso facto, of perceptually represented properties. First, I describe a reasonable and widely agreed upon conception of perceptual representation in the philosophical literature. Then, I report evidence from vision and motor neuroscience concerning the perception of action properties, which is subserved by the ventro-dorsal stream, a portion of the dorsal visual system. Finally, I show that a strong connection can be found between the philosophical idea of perceptual representation I have reported before and the neuroscientific evidence concerning the activity of the ventro-dorsal stream, whose job is, as said, to detect action properties.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories |
No categories specified (categorize this paper) |
Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
DOI | 10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_10 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Two Visual Systems in Molyneux Subjects.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):643-679.
Visual Phenomenology Versus Visuomotor Imagery: How Can We Be Aware of Action Properties?Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3309-3338.
Habitual Actions, Propositional Knowledge, Motor Representations and Intentionality.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):623-635.
Similar books and articles
Pictures, Action Properties and Motor Related Effects.Gabriele Ferretti - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3787-3817.
Perception Through Action.Vittorio Gallese, Laila Craighero, Luciano Fadiga & Leonardo Fogassi - 1999 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5.
The "Conscious" Dorsal Stream: Embodied Simulation and its Role in Space and Action Conscious Awareness.Vittorio Gallese - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):449-63.
The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon.Michael Madary - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):423-438.
Constitutive Strata and the Dorsal Stream.Kristjan Laasik - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):419-435.
Are the Dorsal/Ventral Pathways Sufficiently Distinct to Resolve Perceptual Theory?George J. Andersen - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):96-97.
Against Division: Consciousness, Information and the Visual Streams.Wayne Wu - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (4):383-406.
Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.
Reference, Perception, and Attention.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.
Why Does the Perception-Action Functional Dichotomy Not Match the Ventral-Dorsal Streams in Anatomical Segregation: Optic Ataxia and the Function of the Dorsal Stream.Y. Rossetti - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press.
Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems.Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Real Action in a Virtual World.Melvyn A. Goodale - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):984-985.
Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
Pointing the Way to a Unified Theory of Action and Perception.Mel Goodale - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):749-750.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2019-01-28
Total views
5 ( #1,207,781 of 2,519,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,756 of 2,519,620 )
2019-01-28
Total views
5 ( #1,207,781 of 2,519,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,756 of 2,519,620 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads