Abstract

The author argues that the unity, coherence, and completeness of both the theory of law and the theory of politics and democracy throughout Bobbio’s work was produced by the fruitful connection that he established between the approaches of several different disciplines. Bobbio was able to connect legal theory and political philosophy, and to entwine theory itself, whether legal or philosophical, with meta-theoretical and methodological reflection. In Bobbio’s work even the theoretical-analytical approach was connected with an analytical history of ideas. Bobbio’s capacity for synthesis and the systematic theoretical character of his investigations found specific expression, according to the author, in four fundamental connections: that between democracy and law; that between law and reason; that between reason and peace; and that between peace and human rights. This doctrinal framework, according to Ferrajoli, already suffices to establish Bobbio as a great teacher and thinker. Nonetheless, Ferrajoli also draws attention to certain aporias in Bobbio’s thought. Thus the author argues that Bobbio fails to recognize the influence of strictly defined constitutions on the legal order and continues to defend a merely formal conception of the validity of legal norms and of democracy. Bobbio retains a non-evaluative conception of legal science without considering the internal criticisms regarding the lacunae and antinomies that constitutional norms forcibly reveal with respect to both legal science and the practice of jurisdiction