Chrysippus on Retribution and Rehabilitation

Dois Pontos 10 (2):109-34 (2013)
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Abstract

The present article argues that Chrysippus' reply to the objection that Fate does away with that which is up to us (and therefore with justice in honor and punishments) consists in shifting the notion of that which is up to us from one in terms of ultimate origination to one in terms of self-sufficient causation—and thus in shifting the very notion of justice in honor and punishments from one in retributive terms to one in rehabilitative terms.

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Paulo Fernando Tadeu Ferreira
Universidade Federal de São Paulo

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Determinism and freedom in Stoic philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Doxographi Graeci.Hermann Diels - 1965 - Walter de Gruyter.
Epicurus on freedom.Tim O'Keefe - 2005 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Moral responsibility and moral development in Epicurus’ philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 2006 - In Burkhard Reis & Stella Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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