Abstract

F.H. Bradley has been characterized by many commentators as something of a sceptic. And the reason why Bradley is often cast in this light is, I believe, largely a result of his theory of relations. As even the casual student is aware, the relational nature of all judgment leads, on Bradley’s analysis, to an infinite and, many have claimed, “vicious” regress. And when we add to this Bradley’s claim that all assertion is, at some level, “contradictory”, there seems to be good reason for the sceptical moniker. What I would like to suggest in this paper, though, is that Bradley’s “scepticism” is not what it seems. Hence in what follows I shall argue that Bradley’s views on contradiction and contrariety are actually important aspects of his larger theory of knowledge; and, as such, they should be understood — not as doctrines whose intent is the condemnation of our ordinary inferences — but, rather, as a crucial component in the defense of such practices. What I hope to show, then, is that, far from being an endorsement of radical scepticism, Bradley’s theory of contradiction and contrariety is an effort to preserve the continuity between one judgment and another — a continuity that he sees as necessary to any coherent account of inference. But first some preliminaries.