Psychology and Psychologies: which Epistemology?

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Humana.Mente (2009)
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Abstract

If the definition of a scientific discipline depends on the definition of its object of investigation, the unity of psychology should depend on the unitarian description of the mind. However, the mind is anything but a unitarian concept. Its common sense definition is subject to temporal and geographical variation because the mental is also a cultural construct; and the variety of psychological disciplines nowadays existing proposes several definitions of the mental. The epistemology of psychology investigates the definition of the mental by assuming the pluralism of the psychological disciplines as a fact, rather than as a problem, and it invites psychologists to reason about the epistemological bases of their empirical research.

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Marco Fenici
Università degli Studi di Firenze

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