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Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate: Proving Their (in)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes
Springer Verlag (2018)
Abstract
This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.Author's Profile
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Chapters
The Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes
We study the vulnerability or invulnerability of eight voting procedures to 13 voting paradoxes. The invulnerabilities are explained and the vulnerabilities demonstrated through illustrative profiles where the paradoxes occur under the procedures examined.
The Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes
The vulnerability of six ranked voting procedures which are not Condorcet–consistent to 13 paradoxes is examined in this chapter. For those systems that are vulnerable to some voting paradoxes the vulnerability is demonstrated through illustrative examples showing that there are profiles where the p... see more
The Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes
Focusing on four procedures that do not require the voters to submit full preference rankings over candidates , we discuss, for each procedure, those voting paradoxes to which the procedures are immune and the reasons for this, as well as demonstrate, with the aid of illustrative examples, their vul... see more
Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
18 voting procedures for electing a single candidate are introduced and briefly commented upon. The procedures fall into three classes in terms of the type of voter input and Condorcet consistency: non–ranked procedures, ranked procedures that are not Condorcet–consistent and ranked ones that are Co... see more
Voting Paradoxes
Voting paradoxes pertaining to the election of a single winner are introduced. The paradoxes are divided into five simple paradoxes and eight conditional ones. The simple paradoxes are paradoxes where the relevant data lead to a ‘surprising’ and arguably undesirable outcome, whereas the conditional ... see more
Introduction
Voting is a common way to resolve disagreements regarding policies to be adopted or candidates to be chosen for various positions and is therefore a necessary ingredient of democratic government. Yet there are numerous voting rules that differ from each other in processing the ballots into voting re... see more
Summary
We discuss the findings of the preceding chapters aiming at an overall judgement of the relative merits of the 18 procedures in the light of their vulnerability to various voting paradoxes. No procedure is invulnerable to all the analyzed voting paradoxes, but there are differences in the variety of... see more
The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes
We study the vulnerability or invulnerability of eight voting procedures (Minimax, Dodgson’s, Nanson’s, Copeland’s, Black’s, Kemeny’s, Schwartz’s and Young’s procedures) to 13 voting paradoxes. The invulnerabilities are explained and the vulnerabilities demonstrated through illustrative profiles whe... see more
The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes
Focusing on four procedures that do not require the voters to submit full preference rankings over candidates (Plurality Voting, Plurality with Runoff, Approval Voting, and Successive Elimination), we discuss, for each procedure, those voting paradoxes to which the procedures are immune and the reas... see more
The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes
The (in)vulnerability of six ranked voting procedures which are not Condorcet–consistent (Borda count, Alternative vote, Coombs’ procedure, Bucklin’s procedure, Range Voting and Majority Judgment) to 13 paradoxes is examined in this chapter. For those systems that are vulnerable to some voting parad... see more
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