The Value of Categorical Polythetic Diagnoses in Psychiatry

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4):941-963 (2022)
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Abstract

Some critics argue that the types of psychiatric diagnosis found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and International Classification of Disease are superfluous and should be abandoned. These are known as categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses. To receive a categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnosis an individual need only exhibit some, rather than all, of the symptoms on the diagnostic criteria. Consequently, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses only associate an individual with a range of symptoms rather than specify which symptoms they have. Drawing on Giere’s account of scientific models, I portray categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses as abstract models that guide the building of less abstract models. These models can specify which symptoms a particular individual has. Additionally, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses can guide investigation of symptoms towards difficult to spot symptoms, guide investigation towards changing symptoms, and guide investigation towards how symptoms manifest. These important roles mean categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses should not be abandoned.

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References found in this work

How models are used to represent reality.Ronald N. Giere - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
The cognitive structure of scientific theories.Ronald N. Giere - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):276-296.
Scientific perspectivism: behind the stage door.Ronald N. Giere - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):221-223.

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