Analysis 76 (4):438-444 (2016)

Authors
Giulia Felappi
University of Southampton
Abstract
Traditionally, ‘that’-clauses occurring in attitude attributions are taken to denote the objects of the attitudes. Prior raised a famous problem: even if Frege fears that the Begriffsschrift leads to a paradox, it is unlikely that he fears a proposition, a sentence or what have you as the alleged object denoted by the ‘that’-clause. The usual way out is to say that ‘that’-clauses do not contribute the objects of the attitudes but their contents. I will show that, if we accept this answer, either we’d better stop working on attitude attributions or we’d better work harder on them.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anw064
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.

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Citations of this work BETA

Act‐Type Theories of Propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11).
The Face‐Value Theory, Know‐That, Know‐Wh and Know‐How.Giulia Felappi - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):63-72.

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