Actions and De Re Beliefs

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):577 - 582 (1978)
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Abstract

Many different analyses of the concept of de re belief have been proposed in recent years. Most of these analyses may be called ‘reductionist’ since they attempt to “reduce” de re belief to de dicta belief or to analyze de re belief in terms of de dicta belief. Some reductionist analyses are extremely liberal in their attribution of de re beliefs — they imply that people have de re beliefs in a variety of situations in which more restrictive analyses have no such implication. In this paper I will show that the most liberal of the reductionist theories, those Roderick Chisholm calls “latitudinarian theories”, are unacceptable.Latitudinarian analyses have been proposed by many philosophers, including Ernest Sosa, Mark Pastin, and also, perhaps, W. V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars.

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Citations of this work

Actions and De Re Beliefs.Thomas McKay - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):631 - 635.
De Re Belief Ascriptions and Action Explanations.Eric Stiffler - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):513 - 525.

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References found in this work

Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re.Ernest Sosa - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):883-896.
Thought and Its Reference.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):167 - 172.

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